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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 __________ 
 
MANSMANN,  Circuit Judge. 
 We are revisiting this products liability case after a 
third trial on the alleged defectiveness of a forklift for its 
manufacturer's failure to equip it with an operator restraint 
system.  We focus specifically on issues related to the 
forklift's crashworthiness under Pennsylvania law.  Our task is 
to determine whether the district court's evidentiary rulings, 
permitting evidence proffered by the defendant-manufacturer 
pertaining to its lack of knowledge of such devices at the time 
of the sale, the state of the art, and the desirability of such 
restraints as viewed by the industry, were consistent with 
Pennsylvania's crashworthiness law and its public policy which 
underlies it. 
 
 I. 
 John Habecker was a civilian employee of the New 
Cumberland Army Depot when the forklift he was backing down a 
ramp tumbled from the side of the ramp.  Thrown from the 
  
forklift, Habecker was tragically killed when the forklift fell 
on top of him.  The forklift was manufactured in 1977 by Clark 
Equipment Company and was not designed with an operator restraint 
system (ORS), nor had one subsequently been installed.   
 Habecker's estate and family1 ("Habecker") brought a 
products liability action in the United States District Court for 
the Middle District of Pennsylvania against Clark and Forklifts, 
Inc., the corporation that leased the forklift to the Army, 
alleging that the forklift was defective due to the lack of an 
ORS, for example, a seat belt.2  After trial, the jury returned a 
verdict for the defendants. 
 On appeal, we reversed and remanded for a new trial on 
the operator restraint issue, reasoning that the district court 
erred in refusing to permit Raymond Brandt to testify as an 
                     
1
.   Habecker's wife, Connie L. Habecker, brought this suit 
individually and as personal representative of his estate, as 
well as on behalf of Habecker's son, John Michael, as parent, 
natural guardian and next friend. 
2
.   Originally suit was also brought against Copperloy 
Corporation, the maker of the ramp, and the claims against all 
parties included strict liability, breach of implied warranty and 
negligence.  The implied warranty and negligence claims were 
dismissed prior to the first trial.  The strict liability 
theories were based on alleged defects in both the forklift and 
the ramp.  Habecker submitted that the forklift was defective 
because it had a sticking throttle and had not been designed with 
an ORS.  The ramp was allegedly defective because it lacked 
adequate instructions on how to properly secure it and because it 
did not have an overload relief valve that would keep it from 
overturning. 
  
expert for the plaintiffs.  Habecker v. Copperloy Corp., 893 F.2d 
49, 52-53 (3d Cir. 1990) (Habecker I).3 
 In that appeal, Habecker had also argued that the 
district court erred by continually admitting, over objections, 
extensive testimony and evidence about industry standards, 
government regulations, and other "state of the art" matters 
concerning operator restraints, asserting that such evidence was 
inadmissible in a products liability suit governed by 
Pennsylvania law.  We found it unnecessary to address this issue 
because the case had to be retried.  Nonetheless, we stated:  
"The district court has recognized the problem, and we are 
confident that it will carefully limit the admissibility of such 
evidence on re-trial."  Id. at 53. 
 Finally, Habecker argued that the district court, in 
eliminating the retrofit issue, also dismissed the issue of 
failure to give a post-sale warning.  We expressly held that the 
district court only eliminated the failure-to-retrofit issue, not 
the failure-to-give-a-post-sale-warning issue.  Id. at 54. 
 On retrial, the district court permitted Clark to offer 
evidence relating to its theory of the effectiveness of ORSs in 
1977, demonstrating that the industry had been unable to 
determine whether ORSs reduced the risk of serious injury to the 
operator and that it was only later, after the development of 
                     
3
.   Additionally, we affirmed the district court's grant of 
a directed verdict in favor of Copperloy for lack of a 
substantial factor supporting causation, and we affirmed the 
court's grant of a partial directed verdict in favor of Clark and 
Forklifts on the defective throttle issue.   
  
more sophisticated computer modeling, that the industry decided 
it was desirable to equip forklifts with such systems.  Clark 
argued that as of 1977 a manufacturer could not have known 
whether ORSs created more risks than they eliminated.  Once again 
the jury returned a verdict for the defendants. 
 On appeal, in Habecker v. Clark Equipment Co., 942 F.2d 
210 (3d Cir. 1991) (Habecker II), we distinguished evidence of 
what safety measures were feasible at the time a product was 
designed and evidence of what safety measures were known to be 
desirable at that time.  Noting that this case was one of 
crashworthiness, we held that "[l]iability is imposed on a 
manufacturer in a case for a design defect because an 
alternative, feasible, safer design would have lessened or 
eliminated the injury plaintiff suffered."  Id. at 215.  We 
concluded that:  
 "[i]f no such alternative feasible design 
existed when the product was manufactured, 
then the design cannot be said to be 
`defective,' even if more recent technology 
has rendered a safer design feasible.  
Therefore, the factfinder can only determine 
whether a particular design was defective 
after hearing evidence about what designs 
were feasible at the time the product was 
manufactured and whether they were in fact 
safer."   
 
Id.  We excluded, consistent with Pennsylvania law, any evidence 
of what was or was not known about the desirability of ORSs in 
1977.   
 [T]he only question for the jury was whether 
an operator restraint system is an "element 
necessary to make [a forklift] safe for its 
intended use," Azzarello, 391 A.2d at 1027, a 
  
question that is to be answered on the basis 
of all the knowledge available at the time of 
trial.  Evidence about what Clark knew or 
could have known about the desirability of 
operator restraint systems at the time of 
manufacture is not relevant to that question. 
 
Id. at 216.  We found that there was a substantial possibility 
that the inadmissible evidence influenced the jury's 
determination, focusing its attention on Clark's behavior and 
decision-making rather than on the product's defectiveness. 
 Finally, we held that the district court took a narrow 
view of its own authority on remand.  While the parties were 
preparing for the second trial, the district court issued an 
order stating that pursuant to our opinion in Habecker I, the 
only issue for re-trial was whether the forklift was defective 
when it left Clark, the manufacturer, in 1977.  The district 
court held that the parties would be confined to presenting 
evidence only through the witnesses listed in their original pre-
trial memorandum.  The order prevented Habecker from further 
discovery and from raising new theories of liability.  We stated 
that it was not our intention to so restrain the second trial, 
and although we expressed no view on the direction the district 
court should take, we held only that the decisions on whether to 
allow new claims, whether to permit further discovery, and 
whether to hear additional evidence were all within the district 
court's discretion. 
 On remand for the third trial, but prior to it, 
Habecker filed a motion to exclude all state of the art evidence 
as well as letters and studies purporting to show the dangers of 
  
ORSs in forklift turnovers.  There was extensive discussion on 
this issue in chambers at the pretrial conference on January 29, 
1993.  Clark argued that Habecker II permitted evidence of 
feasibility in a crashworthiness case, i.e., that if Habecker 
offered the 1983 ORS as an "alternative, safer design, 
practicable under the circumstances," Habecker II at 214; see 
also Kupetz at ____, then defense evidence of its feasibility in 
1977 would become relevant.  The district court granted 
Habecker's motion, but in consideration thereof, limited Habecker 
to general evidence about ORSs -- excluding any evidence about 
the 1983 ORS.  631A.   
 Further, the district court permitted, over strenuous 
and continuous objections, defense testimony about user letters 
and concerns pertaining to ORSs, engineering concerns, and 
concerns of various corporations, committees and societies, all 
of which impact the knowledge available to Clark regarding the 
ORSs' desirability.  The jury returned a defense verdict, and 
Habecker now appeals once more. 
 
 II. 
 A. 
 Since the adoption of Section 402A of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts,4 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has remained 
                     
4
.   (1) One who sells any product in a defective 
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user 
or consumer or to his property is subject to 
liability for physical harm thereby caused to 
the ultimate user or consumer, or to his 
property, if (a) the seller is engaged in the 
  
faithful to its view that negligence concepts have no place in a 
products liability trial.  See Lewis v. Coffing Hoist Div., Duff-
Norton, 528 A.2d 590, 593 (Pa. 1987).5  The test for 
defectiveness is whether the "product left the supplier's control 
lacking any element necessary to make it safe for its intended 
use or possessing any feature that renders it unsafe for the 
intended use."  Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 391 A.2d 1020, 1027 
(Pa. 1978).  "[I]t is the product itself which is on trial, and 
not the manufacturer's conduct."  Lewis, 528 A.2d at 593.  In 
(..continued) 
business of selling such a product, and (b) 
it is expected to and does reach the user or 
consumer without substantial change in the 
condition in which it is sold. 
 
 (2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) 
applies although (a) the seller has exercised 
all possible care in the preparation and sale 
of his product, and (b) the user or consumer 
has not bought the product from or entered 
into any contractual relation with the 
seller. 
 
Webb v. Zern, 220 A.2d 853, 854 (Pa. 1966) (quoting Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 402A (1965)).   
5
.   In Lewis the Court also endorsed our opinion in 
Holloway v. J. B. Systems, Ltd., 609 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1979) 
(holding that it was inappropriate to admit evidence of industry 
standards and practices in a products liability trial).  Lewis, 
528 A.2d at 594.  See also Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 391 A.2d 
1020, 1027 (Pa. 1978) (holding that the term "unreasonably 
dangerous" has no place in the instructions to the jury in a 
products liability case); McCown v. International Harvester Co., 
342 A.2d 381 (Pa. 1975) (rejecting contributory negligence as a 
defense to actions grounded in products liability); Berkebile v. 
Brantly Helicopter Corp., 337 A.2d 893 (Pa. 1975) (holding that, 
for policy reasons, a manufacturer should be the guarantor of its 
products' safety, reasoning that the distinction between strict 
liability and negligence is that the exercise of due care in 
strict liability cases is absolutely irrelevant).  
  
Lewis, a case concerning the defectiveness of a control box for a 
hoist, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held:   
 Having reached the conclusion that evidence 
of industry standards relating to the design 
of the control pendent involved in this case, 
and evidence of its widespread use in the 
industry, go to the reasonableness of the 
appellant's conduct in making its design 
choice, we further conclude that such 
evidence would have improperly brought into 
the case concepts of negligence law.  We also 
conclude that such evidence would have 
created a strong likelihood of diverting the 
jury's attention from the appellant's control 
box to the reasonableness of the appellant's 
conduct in choosing its design.  For those 
reasons we conclude that the trial court 
correctly ruled the evidence to be irrelevant 
and hence inadmissible.  It is well 
established that a trial court should exclude 
evidence which has a tendency to distract the 
jury from its main inquiry or confuse the 
issue.   
 
Id. at 594.  For a general discussion of the development of 
products liability law in Pennsylvania see Dillinger v. 
Caterpillar Inc., 959 F.2d 430, 435-37 (3d Cir. 1992).   
 
 B. 
 The parties agree that this case focuses on the 
crashworthiness of the forklift.  In Habecker II we noted that 
although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had yet to adopt the 
crashworthiness doctrine for products liability cases, we had 
previously predicted that it would adopt it, Habecker II, 942 
F.2d at 214 (citing Roe v. Deere & Co., 855 F.2d 151, 153 n.2 (3d 
Cir. 1988)).  We explained that "[u]nder the doctrine of 
crashworthiness, the manufacturer's liability for producing 
  
defectively designed products includes the liability for failing 
to provide safety features and liability for providing inadequate 
safety features.6  Habecker II at 213.  In other words, the 
crashworthiness doctrine imposes liability on the manufacturer 
not for causing the accident, but rather for failing to minimize 
the injuries or even increasing the severity of the injuries 
sustained in an accident brought about by a cause other than the 
alleged defect.  We further discussed our previous decision in 
Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976), where we predicted 
that the New Jersey Supreme Court would adopt the crashworthiness 
doctrine and set forth the criteria required for a prima facie 
case.7   
 We viewed our task in Habecker II as predicting the 
definition the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would give the 
crashworthiness doctrine and specifically, what evidence it would 
find relevant in determining liability.  Id.  We distinguished 
between evidence of feasibility and evidence of desirability, 
although we did not expressly predict the adoption of the Huddell 
criteria for Pennsylvania law.  Recently the Pennsylvania 
                     
6
.   The theory of products liability is applied to three 
types of defects:  design, manufacturing, and marketing 
(warnings).  The crashworthiness doctrine implicates the 
overtures of design defects. 
7
.   There we held that the plaintiff must establish (1) 
that the design in question was defective, offering proof of an 
alternative, safer design, practicable under the circumstances; 
(2) what injuries, if any, would have resulted had the 
alternative, safer design been used; and (3) the extent of 
enhanced injuries attributable to the defective design.  Habecker 
II at 214 (quoting Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 737-38 (3d 
Cir. 1976)). 
  
Superior Court issued an opinion expressly recognizing the 
crashworthiness doctrine as a theory of recovery in Pennsylvania 
and requiring the establishment of the same criteria we set forth 
in Huddell for a successful crashworthiness case.  Kupetz v. 
Deere and Co., LEXIS 1621 (Pa. Superior 1994).8  In Kupetz the 
Superior Court stated: 
 The principle behind the "second collision" 
concept is that, because the way the vehicle 
has been manufactured, a person's injuries 
have been aggravated unnecessarily; and such 
a concept has equal applicability, whether 
the person's second collision is with the 
interior of the vehicle or the exterior 
ground. 
 
  The effect of the crashworthiness 
doctrine is that a manufacturer has a legal 
duty to design and manufacture its product to 
be reasonably crashworthy.  In terms of 
strict product liability, this means that a 
manufacturer has to include accidents among 
the "intended" uses of its product.  A 
manufacturer who fails to fulfill this legal 
duty will be liable to the passenger of a car 
whose injuries are increased due to the 
design defect in the automobile.  Liability 
will attach even though the defect in 
manufacture or design did not cause the 
initial accident or impact. 
 
                     
8
.   Shortly after the adoption of § 402A in Webb, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that "lack of proper safety 
devices can constitute a defective design for which there may be 
recovery."  Bartkewich v. Billinger, 247 A.2d 603, 605 (Pa. 
1968).  Further, in McCown v. International Harvester Co., 342 
A.2d 381 (Pa. 1975), the Court recognized that in a products 
liability action the defect itself did not have to be the cause 
of the accident.  McCown was permitted to recover where the 
defect was not the cause of the collision, but did cause his 
injuries.  These cases provided the basis for the Superior 
Court's determination that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has 
implicitly adopted the crashworthiness doctrine.  Kupetz at 11-
17. 
  
Id. at 12-15 (citations omitted).9 
 A products liability cause of action in Pennsylvania 
has three requirements; it must be shown that:  (1) the product 
was defective, (2) the defect existed while the product was in 
the control of the manufacturer, and (3) the defect was the 
proximate cause of the injuries.  Walton v. Avco Corp., 610 A.2d 
454, 458-59 (Pa. 1992).  The Superior Court in Kupetz, however, 
explained that to establish a cause of action on a 
crashworthiness theory, a subset of a products liability action, 
it must be shown:  (1) that the design of the vehicle was 
defective; 2) that when the design was made, an alternative, 
safer design, practicable under the circumstances existed; (3) 
what injuries, if any, the plaintiff would have received had the 
alternative, safer design, been used; and (4) what injuries were 
attributable to the defective design.  We predict that the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court will adopt the view set forth in 
Huddell and then subsequently by the Superior Court in Kupetz.  
As we have already held in Habecker II that this is a 
crashworthiness case, we must analyze the district court's 
conduct of the trial pursuant to the analysis set forth in 
Kupetz.10 
                     
9
.   We note that for the elements of the crashworthiness 
doctrine, Kupetz cited Dorsett v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc., 
805 F. Supp. 1212, 1218 (E.D. Pa. 1992), which cited Habecker II 
and Huddell for the same language.  It also cited Craigie v. 
General Motors Corp., 740 F. Supp. 353, 356-57 (E.D. Pa.), in 
which the court analyzed Huddell. 
10
.   The record establishes that the district court 
conducted the second trial as a crashworthiness case, pursuant to 
the elements set forth first in Huddell and then in Habecker II. 
  
 
 III. 
 A. 
 Habecker argues that the district court erred in 
permitting defense testimony regarding the knowledge available to 
Clark at the time of the forklift's design about the desirability 
of ORSs.  A corollary is Habecker's argument that the district 
court erred in forcing her to elect whether to refrain from 
offering any evidence about the 1983 ORS or to admit it and "open 
the door" for Clark to counter with evidence concerning the state 
of the art, industry standards, its conduct in the development of 
the 1983 system, and why the 1983 ORS was not feasible in 1977.11  
635A-36A.  We review these decisions for abuse of discretion, but 
to the extent the district court's rulings were predicated on an 
erroneous interpretation of law, our review is plenary.  In re 
Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 257 (3d Cir. 
1983), rev'd on other grounds, 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
 Clark had created two safety videos depicting the 
breakthrough in technology that enabled it to design the 1983 
ORS, and demonstrating the system's superiority.  The target 
                     
11
.   The 1983 ORS was invented in 1983 and then patented in 
1986.  It was allegedly not apparent until 1983, with the advent 
of proper computer technology, that Clark was able to determine 
that some type of ORS was safer than nothing at all.  The 
evidence at the second trial suggested that as of 1977, Clark 
could not have known whether an ORS created more risks than it 
eliminated.  Habecker II at 213.  We held in Habecker II that it 
was irrelevant to the issue of defectiveness when the industry 
determined that placing an ORS on a forklift was more desirable 
than not. 
  
  
audience was forklift drivers in general, and the videos 
described what to do in the event of a rollover accident.  During 
trial Habecker attempted to offer the Clark videos as evidence in 
rebuttal to Frank Entwisle's testimony, but was not permitted to 
do so (1729a).  Entwisle's testimony included, inter alia, the 
contents of the user letters, concerns, and objections to seat 
belts, and the California Department of Industrial Relations' 
decision not to require an ORS on forklifts (1562a-71a).  He also 
testified about the concerns engineers had in deciding whether to 
put on a seat belt (1575a-86a); that in 1977 there was no 
literature or scientific studies available which indicated seat 
belts were safer (1578a); the opinion and concerns of the 
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (1589a-94a); that 
General Motors had opinions against seat belts (1607a); and the 
lack of a recommendation for an ORS in the National Safety 
Council Manual in effect during 1977 (1645a-46a).  Additionally, 
Entwisle testified that in 1977 there was no acceptable ORS that 
could be put on a forklift because the 1983 ORS was not patented 
until 1986 (1591a, 1595a, 1603a-1604a). 
 Clark argues that the purpose of Entwisle's testimony 
was to clarify that operator restraint systems similar to the 
1983 ORS did not exist in 1977 (1514a-15a).  This argument, 
Habecker contends, despite Clark's admission of feasibility,12 is 
                     
12
.   We noted in Habecker II that Clark conceded that an ORS 
would have been feasible in 1977 (261a).  Clark interprets its 
"admission" of feasibility at the second trial, that seat belts 
and wings could be placed on a forklift, not to constitute an 
admission of the feasibility of all other particular ORS designs.  
The district court, in a thorough opinion, ruled that the 
  
unequivocally impermissible in a Pennsylvania products liability 
trial.  We agree.  Clark insists that Habecker misrepresents the 
record when it states that this information was offered to show 
knowledge, conduct, desirability or state-of-the-art.13  Habecker 
argues that the evidence Clark introduced is precisely what 
Habecker II held to be improper, that Clark's evidence is 
inadmissible and improperly focuses the jury's attention on 
Clark's conduct, rather than on the forklift itself.  Again, we 
agree. 
 Clark contends that there is a qualitative difference 
between one type of ORS (automotive seat belt and wing) and 
another (the 1983 ORS).  Clark has consistently argued throughout 
this litigation that while the automotive seat belt and some type 
of wing design was feasible in 1977, it was not safer.  
Conversely, the 1983 ORS design was not feasible in 1977, 
although it may be safer in some circumstances.  According to 
Clark, our result denies it a jury trial because it forces the 
jury to treat differing types of operator restraint systems 
(..continued) 
defendant had only admitted the feasibility of a seat belt and 
some type of wing (423a).  Habecker argues that the district 
court's interpretation of Clark's admission constitutes 
reversible error.  We note that in Habecker II we held that Clark 
had conceded that an ORS was feasible in 1977.  We must affirm 
the district court's decision here absent an abuse of discretion.  
We see no abuse here. 
13
.   Clark insists the testimony was offered so that the 
jury would be able to evaluate the opinion of Mr. Entwisle based 
upon those studies which existed and which formed the basis of 
his opinion. 
  
identically.  It is essentially deprived of presenting the 
feasibility of its ORS to the jury.  
 Clark forcefully argues that design evolution and the 
question of feasibility are linked together in that, over time, 
safety features are invented.  Clark opines that it is common 
knowledge that the first design of a product may be altered and 
improved drastically over the years as new technologies are 
incorporated.  Although the design of the Model T was feasible 60 
years ago, current automobile designs were not; for example, air 
bags and anti-lock brakes are recent safety improvements. 
 
 B. 
 In Pennsylvania the arguments Clark propounds are 
irrelevant.  Pennsylvania's public policy is such that 
manufacturers of products are encouraged to make them as safe as 
possible, as soon as possible.  In Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 
391 A.2d 1020, 1024 (Pa. 1978), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
stated that the supplier of a product is the guarantor of its 
safety.  In that regard, evidence of Clark's conduct is 
absolutely irrelevant.  The forklift is on trial here, Lewis v. 
Coffing Hoist Div., Duff-Norton, 528 A.2d 590, 593 (Pa. 1987); 
nothing Clark did or knew in its decision making capacity or 
design choice is relevant to that inquiry.14   
                     
14
.   Pennsylvania is not alone in emphasizing the safety of 
the product, rather than the manufacturer's conduct, in design 
defect cases.  See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 
447 (Cal. 1978) (emphasizing its "continued adherence to the 
principle that, in a product liability action, the trier of fact 
must focus on the product, not on the manufacturer's conduct"); 
  
 In Habecker II we distinguished between feasibility and 
desirability.  Feasibility means:  1) capable of being done, 
(..continued) 
Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 450 N.E.2d 204, 207 (N.Y. 1983) 
(stating that in a design defect case, "[t]he focus shifts from 
the conduct of the manufacturer to whether the product, as 
designed, was not reasonably safe . . . .  A manufacturer is held 
liable regardless of his lack of actual knowledge of the 
condition of the product").   
 
 Other states disagree.  See, e.g., Prentis v. Yale Mfg. 
Co., 365 N.W.2d 176, 184 (Mich. 1984) (stating that "[a]lthough 
many courts have insisted that the risk-utility tests they are 
applying are not negligence tests because their focus is on the 
product rather than the manufacturer's conduct, . . . the 
distinction on closer examination appears to be nothing more than 
semantic . . . .  The underlying negligence calculus is 
inescapable"); Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 479 A.2d 374, 385 (N.J. 
1984) (stating that "[w]hen the strict liability defect consists 
of an improper design . . . reasonableness of the defendant's 
conduct is a factor in determining liability").  See also Lewis 
v. Coffing Hoist Div., Duff-Norton, 528 A.2d 590, 593-94 (Pa. 
1987). 
 
 The rationale for strict liability was originally 
adopted for defective products, that is, products that were not 
as the manufacturer intended.  Manufacturers were deemed to be in 
the best position to provide "insurance" against accidents by 
spreading the cost of accidents among all consumers of the 
product.  The theory concludes that manufacturers would self-
impose the most efficient level of care if they were held liable 
for defects.  Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A cmts. a-d 
(1965).  Furthermore, manufacturers have better access to 
information about their manufacturing processes.  Thus, the 
theory maintains that it is sensible to require manufacturers to 
come forward with this information. 
 
 This rationale is not on all fours with design defects, 
where the product is as the manufacturer intended.  See, e.g., 
Prentis, 365 N.W.2d at 185 (discussing the incompatibility of 
strict liability and design defects).  For example, cost 
spreading is not effective when the entire product line is 
defective and every consumer is equally at risk, and further the 
rules of discovery detract from the information-access argument.  
We acknowledge, however, that a strict liability regime, as 
opposed to negligence, does provide manufacturers with added 
incentive to design their products with care. 
  
executed, or effected, possible of realization; 2) capable of 
being managed, utilized, or dealt with successfully.  Webster's 
Third New International Dictionary of the English Language 
Unabridged.  Desirability means the quality, fact, or degree of 
being desirable or having worth, and desirable means worth 
seeking or doing as advantageous, beneficial or wise.  Id.  We 
acknowledge the district court's strenuous effort to attempt to 
follow our mandate from Habecker II.  The line between 
feasibility and desirability is certainly a fine one.  To argue 
the lack of feasibility is to argue that the 1983 ORS was 
incapable of being placed on the forklift in 1977 for some reason 
other than its nonexistence, possibly a mechanical 
incompatibility.  The fact that the 1983 ORS did not exist in 
1977, although an intuitively attractive argument, does not mean 
that it was incapable of being placed on the truck in 1977 if it 
did in fact exist. 
 Therefore, we find that the user letters, concerns, and 
objections to seat belts are inadmissible; as is the engineers' 
lack of knowledge whether seat belts would indeed be safer.  They 
are in response to desirability, that is, whether it was 
advantageous to put ORSs on forklifts.  A viable argument would 
be that the 1983 ORS is not safer, or would not have helped in 
this situation, although we realize the inconsistency such a 
position would have in light of the videotapes depicting Clark's 
ardent support for the 1983 ORS.  As we said in Habecker II, the 
decision is made with all available knowledge at the time of the 
trial.  That is simply the nature of strict liability in 
  
Pennsylvania.  As stated above, Pennsylvania's public policy is 
to encourage manufacturers to make their products as safe as 
possible, as soon as possible.  It is the jury's prerogative to 
hold a manufacturer responsible for not more aggressively 
researching and implementing safety devices. 
 All this must be integrated with what we said in Huddle 
regarding crashworthiness, that is, that a plaintiff must show 
that an alternative, safer design practicable under the 
circumstances existed.  In Pennsylvania, "practicable under the 
circumstances" is an element militating toward feasibility.  
Practicable means possible to practice or perform, capable of 
being put into practice, done, or accomplished, feasible.  
Websters' Third New International Dictionary of the English 
Language Unabridged.  Therefore, like feasibility, that element 
bars the admission of the evidence Clark would like to present 
regarding the 1983 ORS's non-existence.15 
 On remand, the district court must conduct a new trial 
based exclusively on the principles of Pennsylvania 
crashworthiness law we have described.  Thus, Habecker may admit 
any evidence that demonstrates a safer design, including the 
Clark videos and anything else depicting the technology that was 
feasible in 1977.  The defendants may not counter with evidence 
that the 1983 ORS was not in existence at the time of 
manufacture, nor shall it be permitted to offer any evidence 
                     
15
.   Habecker raises two other issues that, because of our 
result here, have become moot:  (1) jury instructions; and (2) 
misconduct in questioning.   
  
regarding the knowledge of desirability, including the knowledge 
of any corporations, societies, or committees.16  They may offer 
evidence which impacts upon the safety of the ORS suggested by 
Habecker, and/or its feasibility in 1977. 
 
 IV. 
 Habecker raises a number of issues that were 
categorically a matter for the district court's discretion.  We 
emphasize that we review these issues under an abuse of 
discretion standard, and we will not substitute our judgment for 
that of the district court unless there has been an abuse of 
discretion.  Stich v. United States, 730 F.2d 115, 117 (3d Cir. 
1984). 
 
 A.   
 Habecker argues that it was an abuse of discretion for 
the district court to refuse to allow the plaintiff to raise on 
retrial the issue whether the forklift was defective due to the 
lack of post-sale warnings.  Habecker was under the mistaken 
belief at the first trial that the district court's elimination 
of the retrofit issue also precluded the issue of failure to give 
a post-sale warning of defectiveness.  In Habecker I we held that 
Habecker's assumption was erroneous and that the district court 
did not rule on the issue of post-sale warnings regarding 
                     
16
.   While accepting the testimony for qualifying expert 
witnesses, the district court must be careful to scrutinize for 
this type of evidence. 
  
defectiveness.  Id. n.4.  At the second trial the district court 
took a narrow view of its discretion and only permitted one issue 
to be tried -- whether the forklift was defective when it left 
the manufacturer because it lacked a seat belt or an operator 
restraint system.  Habecker II at 217.   
 After the second trial had taken place, the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court issued an opinion recognizing a post-
sale duty to warn in Pennsylvania.  Walton v. Avco Corp., 557 
A.2d 373 (Pa. Super. 1989); allocatur granted, 568 A.2d 1245, 
1249 (Pa. 1989).  Habecker moved for permission to raise the 
post-sale-duty-to- warn issue at the third trial.  The district 
court denied the motion for a number of reasons:  (1) the Walton 
case was in conflict with other Superior Court cases; (2)  the 
district court distinguished the facts of this case from the 
facts of Walton; (3) the Walton case was the only case in 
Pennsylvania recognizing such a duty; and (4) the opinion itself 
warned that the duty was only to apply to "unique and costly 
products" and not "household goods."  The district court 
concluded that forklifts, unlike the helicopters in Walton, 
militate toward the common product side of the spectrum.   
 Prior to the start of the third trial, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court issued its opinion in Walton, affirming the 
Superior Court's decision on the post-sale duty to warn.  Walton 
v. Avco Corp., 610 A.2d 454 (Pa. 1992).  Habecker then filed a 
motion for reconsideration with the district court; however, the 
district court remained faithful to its initial analysis of the 
case.  The court held: 
  
 As an initial matter, the court wishes to 
underline the procedural footing of this 
motion.  The court is not in a position where 
it is deciding a motion to dismiss prior to 
trial; instead, the court is merely weighing 
whether or not, in its discretion, it 
believes that Plaintiffs should, going into a 
retrial, be permitted to pursue a cause of 
action which had been neither pled nor 
pursued at the prior trial.   
 
538A. 
 The court noted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's 
decision in Walton rendered invalid two of its four 
justifications -- numbers 1 and 3 -- for denying Habecker's 
motion to proceed with a post-sale duty to warn claim.  The court 
also noted that factors 2 and 4 of its earlier opinion remained 
firm and weighed against permitting Habecker to raise this claim.  
Accordingly, the district court exercised its discretion and 
denied Habecker's motion for reconsideration, thus excluding a 
post-sale duty to warn claim as set forth in Walton v. Avco. 
 We have consistently recognized that the assertion of 
new issues on retrial is typically within the sound discretion of 
the district court.  As presider over the trial, the district 
court is in the best position to control all aspects of trial, 
including further motions, discovery and court time.  We cannot 
say that the district court did not exercise sound discretion in 
denying Habecker's motion. 
 As alternative support for this result, Clark and 
Forklifts submit that Habecker did not raise this issue in the 
first amended complaint and that it was not until the pretrial 
memorandum that it was raised.  There are two types of warnings 
  
at issue here:  (1) a warning to operators not to jump during a 
lateral turnover; and (2) the post-sale duty to warn of a 
defective product.  A review of the pleadings prior to the first 
trial demonstrates that Habecker did raise an issue regarding 
warnings:  "Lack of adequate warnings and/or instructions."  53A.  
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 only requires notice pleading; 
therefore, Habecker did not need to specify what type of warnings 
were lacking.  We note, however, that the district court 
subsequently granted motions for summary judgment for Clark and 
Forklifts "on the issue of warnings."  Order of October 14, 1988 
-- 122A.  Therefore it appears to us that if Habecker was 
intending to take advantage of notice pleading by not expressing 
the type of warning being raised, then the district court's order 
dismissing any issue regarding warnings would encompass whatever 
was intended.17   
 We also notice that the district court stated in its 
memorandum opinion of March 31, 1992 that Habecker had opted not 
to pursue a cause of action for post-sale duty to warn at the 
first trial because the law was unsettled with regard to whether 
such a failure to give post-sale warnings would give rise to a 
strict liability cause of action in Pennsylvania.  Memorandum of 
March 31, 1992, 412A.  Further, we are impressed by the 
discussion in chambers prior to the second trial.  725A-27A.  
Counsel for Clark explained to the court that the only issue 
                     
17
.   We note that in Habecker I we held that the district 
court did not address the post-sale duty to warn.  It appears 
that this is because Habecker did not raise it. 
  
regarding the duty to warn raised at the first trial was the duty 
to warn not to jump from the forklift.  Notably, argument before 
the magistrate judge included only that pertaining to the duty to 
warn not to jump during a lateral turnover.  There was no other 
warning issue pursued at trial, no evidence admitted, no argument 
to the jury and no points for charge requested on post-sale duty 
to warn.   
 Therefore, we are led to the inevitable conclusion that 
the district court acted well within its discretion in refusing 
to allow Habecker to pursue the post-sale-duty-to-warn issue.  
Nonetheless, in accord with Habecker II, we will again refrain 
from expressing a view on whether the district court should 
permit a new theory of liability to be pursued on retrial.  The 
matter will be left to the sound discretion of the district 
court.  Id. at 218.18 
                     
18
.   Habecker also argues that the district court abused its 
discretion in restricting them to the evidence, witnesses, and 
testimony from the first trial.  We held in Habecker II that such 
rulings were within the district court's discretion and the 
district court has issued a sound opinion on this issue.  Our 
review does not reveal an abuse of discretion. 
 
 Similarly, Habecker argues that the district court 
abused its discretion in denying the request to compel answers to 
interrogatories from 1987.  The district court addressed this 
issue twice, the second time in a well reasoned opinion.  We see 
no abuse of discretion. 
 
 Finally, Habecker argues that the district court abused 
its discretion in restricting the scope of cross-examination of 
two defense experts.  Specifically, Habecker wanted to question 
the experts on matters the experts had noted in their files but 
which they did not rely on for their opinion.  We find no abuse 
of discretion here.   
  
 
  
 B. 
 Habecker argues that the district court abused its 
discretion in refusing to allow the issue of whether the forklift 
was defective when it was leased in 1983 and 1984.  Strict 
liability in Pennsylvania is extended to all suppliers of a 
product that is "consumed" by the public.  Francioni v. Gibsonia 
Truck Corp., 372 A.2d 736 (Pa. 1977).  Forklifts, which leased 
the forklift to the government, could possibly be liable to 
Habecker under such a theory.  At the first trial Habecker chose 
not to pursue this issue "for tactical reasons."  Memorandum 
Opinion of March 31, 1992 -- 410A.  Prior to the third trial, 
Habecker filed a motion asking the district court to reinstate 
this claim.  The district court denied the motion, relying 
heavily on the argument by the defendants that to permit Habecker 
to pursue the lease claims now would work an extreme prejudice on 
Forklifts due to its reliance on Habecker's actions and 
representations prior to the first trial. 
 Prior to the first trial Habecker dismissed all 
negligence claims.  Because Habecker was not pursuing the 
defectiveness of the forklift in 1983 and 1984 and because the 
negligence claims against Forklifts had been dropped, Forklifts 
had no need to maintain its third party action against the United 
States.  As a result, Forklifts dropped the United States from 
the lawsuit.19   
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.   Forklifts had an indemnity agreement contained in the 
written lease for the forklift with the United States New 
Cumberland Army Depot.  The United States agreed to "save and 
  
 Habecker argues that Forklifts' reasons for dismissing 
its third party complaint against the government had nothing to 
do with Habecker's decision not to pursue the negligence claims 
against Forklifts.  The district court, which was in the best 
position to monitor what had transpired, disagreed.  The record 
does not indicate why Habecker chose not to pursue the 
defectiveness of the forklift at the time of its lease; however, 
it is clear that Habecker made that choice.  Therefore, we find 
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Habecker's motion to pursue the defectiveness of the forklift 
during the 1983 and 1984 leases.   
 
 C. 
 Habecker argues that the district court abused its 
discretion by refusing to allow the testimony and photographs of 
David Wile, the New Cumberland Army Depot's Safety Director.  
After the accident Wile conducted an investigation and attempted 
to simulate the accident.  Wile was never listed in a discovery 
response or pretrial memorandum as an expert witness, and as a 
result, the district court refused to recognize Wile as an 
expert.  The district court was certainly entitled to enforce its 
pretrial order, requiring the listing of witnesses in compliance 
with discovery requests by limiting Habecker to the experts 
identified in the witness list and in responses to 
(..continued) 
hold harmless Forklifts, Inc. from any and all claims or suits 
. . . ." 
  
interrogatories requesting the identity of experts and the 
substance of their testimony.  Franklin Music Company v. ABC, 616 
F.2d 528, 539-40 (3d Cir. 1979).  Such an order will not be 
disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion.  Id.   
 As a second basis for its ruling, the district court 
held that Wile's simulation was not reliable, and that certain 
factors were missing which would cause problems for the other 
experts.  The record demonstrates that Wile did not have an 
engineering degree and had never taken a course in structural 
engineering or biomechanical engineering.  Nor has he had any 
training in dynamics, physics or kinematics.  In fact, Wile 
testified that he had never heard of the word "kinematics."  His 
experience in mathematics, physics and dynamics arises from a 
layman's point of view.  He testified that he was not a trained 
mechanic but did have mechanical abilities.20   
 In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. 
Ct. 2786 (1993), the Supreme Court has recently explained that 
the district court must ensure that any and all scientific 
testimony or evidence is reliable.  Further, Federal Rule of 
Evidence 702 requires that the evidence or testimony assist the 
                     
20
.   Wile has a degree from Penn State in social science.  
He worked for State Farm Insurance Company for four years as an 
accident investigator and damage appraiser.  While with State 
Farm he received training in accident occurrence and recreation, 
and how to record and document evidence.  During his employment 
with the United States government, Wile took courses involving 
occupational safety and health, industrial safety, industrial 
hygiene and accident investigation.  Wile cautioned that his 
training did not involve engineering or physics and that the 
government would hire a specialist in that area if that expertise 
was needed. 
  
trier of fact in understanding the evidence or a fact in issue.  
This question, the Supreme Court held, goes to relevance.21  Id. 
at 2795 (citing United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d 
Cir. 1985) (approving of Judge Becker's description of "fit")).  
The test entails the district court's preliminary assessment of 
whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is 
scientifically valid and whether it can be applied to the facts 
in issue.  Id. at 2796.   
 To that end we note that during the simulation the ramp 
was pulled away from the trailer instead of moving on its own.  
There was no operator on the forklift nor was there cargo on the 
fork.  The height of the fork was disregarded and the rearward 
movement of the forklift was not replicated.  Although Wile 
recognized the velocity of the forklift as an important effect, 
he made no attempt to duplicate it.  The district court held that 
the attempt at the accident simulation was unreliable.  Further, 
although not stated by the district court, it appears that the 
evidence from Wile's simulation does not "fit" the facts of this 
case and would not assist the trier of fact in determining how 
the accident occurred.   
 Therefore, in light of the test set forth in Daubert, 
we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
                     
21
.   We had held in Habecker I that the proffered knowledge, 
skill, experience, training or education possessed by an expert 
goes to the weight of the testimony not its admissibility.  
However, recently, the United States Supreme Court held that the 
test set forth in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 
1923), has been displaced by the Federal Rules of Evidence.  
  
refusing to allow Habecker to admit Wile as an expert or to 
permit him to testify about his report.   
 
 D. 
 Habecker complains that the trial court abused its 
discretion in failing to strike the testimony of Dr. Cline Turner 
Young, which was based on facts contrary to the facts stipulated 
by the parties.  Specifically, Habecker argues that the parties 
agreed that the forklift fell only one foot rather than four feet 
as Dr. Young opined.  However, our review of the stipulations 
read to the jury reveals that no distance was specified.  In 
fact, our review of Dr. Young's testimony reveals that he was 
calculating the change in forces if the forklift dropped only one 
foot, where the chance of a brain injury fatality would be 90%, 
as opposed to a four foot drop, where the chance of a brain 
injury fatality would be "99 plus, plus, plus percent."  It 
appears that Dr. Young believed that Mr. Habecker would have died 
as a result of the accident whether the forklift fell one foot or 
four feet.   
 Contrary to Habecker's assertion, the record reveals 
that Dr. Young's testimony was confined to hypotheses consistent 
with the evidence before the jury.  Dr. Young carefully explained 
every step of his analysis and cited the sources of each piece of 
his data.  Further, it does not appear that Dr. Young's testimony 
contradicted the stipulation but merely supplemented it.  The 
stipulation gave only a general account of what transpired and 
did not completely explain the physical evidence; Dr. Young's 
  
testimony provides in more detail his opinion as to how the 
accident occurred.  Therefore, we hold that the district court 
did not abuse its discretion in denying Habecker's motion to 
strike Dr. Young's testimony. 
 
 V. 
 Thus, for the foregoing reasons we will vacate the 
district court's judgment on the verdict and remand for a new 
trial.   
  
 
